The Importance Of Army weapons

The Department of Defense has long talked about the importance of non-lethal weapons — arms designed to minimize fatalities and unnecessary damage. But a new report from the non-partisan Government Accountability Office comprehensively demolishes the Pentagon’s Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program, finding fault with almost every aspect of its work. Years were spent developing useless systems, weapons were fielded without proper testing or adequate supplies of ammunition, and countless millions of dollars were wasted.

Established in 1996, the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program is supposed to be the U.S. military’s central clearinghouse for researching, developing, testing, and training troops on these less-than-lethal arms. It’s also responsible for policies and procedures for how and when to use the weapons — while coordinating "requirements" for what the Army, Navy and Air Force might need in the future. According to the GAO, failed in just about all of these efforts.

Take R&D, for instance. "The Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program has conducted more than 50 research and development efforts and spent at least $386 million since 1997, but it has not developed any new weapons," the report says.

Perhaps the biggest flop was the Program’s most visible project — the Active Denial System, a microwave "pain beam" design to send crowds running. The core technology mostly works. But the system’s logistics make it way too tough to bring to a warzone. Not only does it have "several subsystems that are too complex for extensive field repair," according to the GAO. The system needs "about 16 hours" to reach its supercool operating temperature, "making it difficult to use on short notice unless the compressor is kept continuously running." The latest "prototype weighs more than 9 tons, and has been mounted on a heavier vehicle than the first prototype to accommodate additional armor and air-conditioning. Because of its weight, it is not easily used for missions requiring mobility." No wonder the program "terminated efforts" to deploy the Active Denial System overseas in 2008, after spending more than $55 million.

The reports also criticizes the Program for taking too long to recognize programs that simply aren’t getting anywhere. For example, there’s the Mobility Denial System, which used slippery foam to make area impassable to vehicles. Development went on for eight years at a cost of about $10 million until it was canceled "because it did not meet combat developers’ needs and its extensive water requirement was considered a logistics burden." The only positive outcome is for the guys who got to spend eight years having fun skidding jeeps and trucks over slippery foam.